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Abstract 
Interest has grown in Water Quality Trading (WQT) as a means to achieve water quality goals, 
with more than 70 such programs now in operation in the United States. Substantial evidence 
exists that nonpoint sources can reduce nutrient loading at a much lower cost than point sources, 
implying the existence of gains from trade. Despite the potential gains, however, the most 
commonly noted feature of existing WQT markets is low trading volume, with many markets 
resulting in zero trades. This paper evaluates one explanation for the lack of participation from 
agricultural nonpoint sources. We test for and quantify the “intangible costs” that may deter 
farmers from trading even if the monetary benefits from doing so outweigh the observable out-
of-pocket costs. We do so by designing and implementing a series of choice experiments to elicit 
WQT trading behavior of Great Plains crop producers in different situations. Attributes of the 
choice experiment included market rules and features (e.g., application time and effort, penalties 
for violations, means of monitoring compliance) that may affect farmers’ willingness to trade.  
The choice experiments were conducted with a total of 135 producers at four locations in the 
state of Kansas between August 2006 and January 2007. A Random Parameters Logit model is 
appropriate to analyze the resulting data, revealing diversity in the way that the attributes affect 
farmers’ choices.    3
Choice Experiments to Assess Farmers' Willingness to Participate in a Water Quality 
Trading Market 
 
Water Quality Trading (WQT) has received increased attention as a means to achieve water 
quality goals. Several such trading programs have been adopted in several states throughout the 
nation, with more than 70 programs now in operation (Breetz et al., 2004). In principle, such 
programs could be applied to any water-borne pollutant and allow trading among point sources, 
among nonpoint sources, or between point and nonpoint sources (the latter is known as ‘point-
nonpoint trading’). Most of the existing programs are designed with point-nonpoint trading to 
limit nutrient loading: point sources are allowed to meet their nutrient emission limits by 
purchasing water quality credits from agricultural producers in the surrounding watershed. These 
producers are then obligated to implement a best management practice (BMP) that reduces 
expected nutrient loading by an amount commensurate with the number of credits sold.  
Substantial evidence exists that nonpoint sources can reduce nutrient loading at a much 
lower cost than point source polluters in many watersheds. This suggests that a well functioning 
WQT program would be a more cost-effective strategy for meeting total maximum daily load 
requirements than regulating point source polluters alone (Faeth, 2000). The potential for 
pollution trading to lower control costs has already been realized in the active air quality trading 
markets (NCEE, 2001). 
Despite the potential gains from WQT, perhaps the most commonly noted feature of 
existing programs is low trading volume; none of the programs have had extensive trading 
activity and many have had no trading at all (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997). Our particular 
interest in this paper is the participation of nonpoint sources, almost always agricultural crop 
producers in existing programs. The reluctance of farmers to participate in WQT reflects a   4
broader reluctance to adopt environmental practices in exchange for monetary payments (e.g., 
Cooper and Keim 1996).  
  Evidently, farmers perceive some intangible costs of participating in WQT markets that 
are not offset by the monetary gains from trading. These costs may include the disutility of the 
managerial effort required to maintain BMPs, and/or a distaste for the WQT market procedures 
and rules. For example, farmers may object to the intrusiveness of being inspected or monitored 
to ensure their BMP is in place, or find the process of signing up for the program to be too 
onerous.  
Although the existence of intangible costs is apparent from empirical evidence, the 
factors giving rise to these costs are not well understood. The objective of this paper is to 
quantify the impact of different institutional factors on farmer’s stated behavior in a WQT 
market. In particular, we wish to determine the importance – relative to monetary trading income 
– of various WQT market attributes on farmers’ willingness to participate in such a market. The 
magnitude of these factors will provide information about how to design a program to encourage 
participation and, more broadly, will identify the situations where a WQT market is feasible 
given that certain rules are necessary. 
The method of choice experiments is well suited to our research question. Choice 
experiments were originally developed in the marketing literature in order to determine the 
implicit market value of various product attributes. Subjects in these experiments make a choice 
from a side-by-side comparison of 3 or more products, which vary by different attributes 
including price. The choice data is then analyzed using discrete choice regression models, such 
as conditional logit, to estimate the effect of each attribute on the probability that the consumer 
chooses the product. This method has been widely adopted by environmental economists   5
studying choice behavior related to environmental quality, such as selection of recreation sites 
(e.g., Adamowicz et al., 1997) and housing location (e.g., Earnhart, 2001). Economists studying 
agricultural markets have also applied the method to understand the attributes of food products 
influencing consumers’ shopping choices (e.g., Fox et al., 2002).  
This paper describes a set of choice experiments designed to elicit WQT trading behavior 
of Great Plains crop producers in different situations. In our case, the attributes to be varied 
across choices are the features of trading, such as the effort required for signup and the 
monitoring the farmer would need to undergo. Choice experiments were conduced in person with 
producers at events in different locations in Kansas from August 2006 through January 2007.  
 
Experimental Design 
The purpose of our experiments is to identify market rules and attributes that influence farmers’ 
willingness to participate in a point-nonpoint WQT market. After reviewing the operations of 
existing programs and consulting with Extension personnel and a small group of farmers in 
Kansas, we identified four market attributes that are likely to affect participation: (1) application 
time and effort, (2) the monitoring method, (3) penalties for violations, and (4) the BMP to be 
adopted. Embedded within the definition of BMPs is another key attribute: the degree of 
flexibility a farmer would have in fulfilling his trading obligations. As noted above, the price of 
credits is an additional explicit attribute, which will ultimately allow us to compute the implicit 
values of the other four. These attributes are listed in Table 1 and are described in more detail 
below. 
By designing our experiments with different levels of our five attributes, we generate a 
dataset that allows us to test whether the institutional attributes affect trading choices, and if so,   6
the magnitude of these impacts relative to price. Farmers were asked to choose among different 
opportunities to trade, which varied across the five attributes. Such choice scenarios would arise 
in an actual trading program, for example, if a WQT program were established in some region 
that allowed buyers to spell out the terms of the trading contract. Different buyers would then 
develop different contracts suiting their needs, giving rise to a range of trading opportunities for 
farmers. In the choice experiment method, the attributes are varied systematically based on 
experimental design principles, so that the resulting dataset maximizes statistical efficiency. In 
what follows, we describe the attributes we vary in our choice experiments and then explain the 
procedures we followed to design our choice sets.  
 
Design Attributes 
This section describes each of the attributes varied in our experiments and rationale for the levels 
we selected (Table 1). As noted above, trading opportunities are defined as different 
combinations of these attribute levels. A sample choice scenario presented to farmers is in Figure 
1. Each scenario asks farmers to choose one of two trading opportunities, labeled Option A and 
Option B, or else choose Option C - “do not enroll.” To facilitate comparison, all trading 
opportunities were assumed to be for a 10-year contract on a 100-acre field.   
The first attribute in the choice experiment is Application Time. This refers to the amount 
of time a potential seller would have to spend to establish his eligibility to enter into a WQT 
contract. This time would be expended on such activities as meeting with the staff of the entity 
managing the market, compiling data on the field to be enrolled, and filling out paperwork. 
Application Time would vary depending on the complexity of the program and the desires of the   7
buyer in the contract. We set this attribute to vary from 4 to 40 hours to enroll a 100-acre field, a 
range we assumed was large enough to capture a wide range of contract complexity. 
The Monitoring Method has two categorical levels. If Monitoring Method = Annual 
Verification, then farmers entering into a contract would be visited at an unannounced time each 
year to ensure they are meeting the terms of the contract. The field where the contracted BMP is 
to be installed would be inspected to verify that the practice is being implemented and 
maintained as agreed. If Monitoring Method = Spot Check, then the farmer would be visited with 
a 10% probability each year, implying that one visit would occur during an average 10-year 
contract period. If visited, the type of inspection would be the same as with Annual Verification. 
These two possibilities reflect varying levels of “intrusiveness” the seller must be willing to 
accept. 
The Penalty is a one-time fine to be paid if the seller is found in violation of the contract. 
Levels of this attribute range from $50/acre to $500/acre, a sufficiently wide variation to ensure 
that farmers would not find it rational to “plan on cheating” and paying the fine when caught. For 
example, under the Spot Check system of monitoring, the upper end of this range produces an 
expected penalty from cheating of $50/acre/year. This exceeds the maximum revenue that could 
be earned from entering into a contract ($25/acre/year - see below), which is also the maximum 
possible gain from cheating on a contract. 
The BMP is the fourth attribute, which takes on four categorical levels indicating four 
distinct BMPs. The four BMPs vary along two dimensions. The first dimension is the type of 
practice – the farmer must either install a filter strip or implement no-till. The second dimension 
is the level of flexibility the farmer would have in meeting his contract obligations. In the case of 
filter strips the more flexible option would allow farmers to hay and or graze the filter-designated   8
area. For no-till, flexibility comes in the form frequency of use – “rotational no-till” allows for 
some other tillage practice in 5 out of the 10 years under contract. We designed our scenarios so 
that Option A was always of the filter strip variety and Option B was always of the No-till 
variety. This reduces the number of degrees of freedom in our experimental design, by 
effectively reducing this four-level attribute to a two-level attribute.  
The BMPs will be a significant determinant of farmers’ choice if they value flexibility, or 
if they perceive differences in implementation costs. One complication in comparing the BMPs 
is that filter strips involve up-front installation costs: the land for the filter strip must be tilled, 
leveled, and seeded to grass in the first year. On the other hand, KSU Extension crop budgets 
indicate an expected cost of zero for a typical Kansas farmer to implement no-till. To make this 
comparison more straightforward for respondents, they were told that the installation costs of 
filter strips would be covered from “an outside source.” This is not unrealistic, as cost share 
funds from both state and federal programs are available to pay for installing buffer strips 
statewide.  
Another reason we removed the installation costs was to focus the respondent’s attention 
on comparing the ongoing managerial costs of the practices. To clarify the managerial costs of 
each of these practices, farmers were given specific definitions of the practices along with a list 
of maintenance responsibilities. “100% No-till,” for example, was defined as the tillage practice 
where the only equipment that breaks the soil surface is a planter, and this occurs at most once 
annually. For filter strips, the maintenance requirements were to regularly check for and repair 
any gullies that develop, to avoid using the filter strip as a roadway, and to avoid broadcast 
application of chemicals or manure in the filter strip area.   9
  The final attribute is trading revenue, or the price per credit multiplied by the number of 
credits generated from the BMP. We varied trading revenue from $3/acre/year to $25/acre/year, 
following the range used by Cooper and Keim (1996) and Cooper (1997). Each BMP was 
assumed to generate a fixed number of credits (Table 2), and the price per credit was calculated 
in each scenario so that price times credits equaled the specified revenue level. For example, in 
Option A of the scenario shown in figure 1, our experimental design called for a revenue of 
$15/acre/year and a BMP of Filter Strip (with haying/grazing), a practice which would generate 
6 credits/acre (Table 2).The price per credit was then calculated as $15/6 = $2.50. As described 
below, we generated 32 different choice sets encompassing 64 distinct trading choices. Across 
all 64 choices, the variation in credits (see table 2) combined with the variation in revenue ($3-
$25) produced a variation in the price per credit of $0.25 to $5.00.  
 
Design Procedures  
As noted above, our experimental subjects were to respond to choice sets, each of which contains 
two trading opportunities with five attributes. Thus there are a total of ten attributes to be varied 
across choice sets. Our experimental design problem is to construct a collection of choice sets by 
systematically varying these 10 factors. 6 of these factors have 4 levels and the remaining 4 have 
2 levels, implying that a complete factorial spanning all possible combinations these factors 
would require 65,536 distinct choice sets – obviously a prohibitive number of scenarios to 
present to respondents.  
We used the SAS %MktRuns macro (Kuhfeld, 2005) to identify the minimum number of 
choice sets in an orthogonal main effects design. An orthogonal main effects design is a small 
sample of all combinations in the full factorial, where the chosen combinations exhibit a zero   10
correlation among the attributes. The smallest orthogonal main effects design contains 32 choice 
sets, and such a design was constructed using the SAS %MktEx macro (Kuhfeld, 2005). The 
choice sets were then blocked into two sets of 16, so that our choice experiment came in two 




Our choice experiments were conducted in person with farmers at different producer-oriented 
conferences in Kansas. A total of 135 subjects completed the experiment at four different events 
between August 2006 and January 2007 (Table 4). The Risk and Profit Conference is an annual 
event hosted by the Agricultural Economics Department at KSU, drawing participants from all 
around the state. The second event was a statewide Farm Bureau conference, in January 2007 in 
Wichita. The Agricultural Profitability Conferences are run by KSU Extension economists at 
various locations around the state in winter months, and mainly draw regional audiences (Colby 
and Smith Center are in western and central Kansas, respectively). The Farm Bureau conference 
is also a statewide event. The events were chosen in part to ensure a representative geographic 
distribution of farmers across the state. 
Our data collection procedures at all these events were as follows. First, experimental 
subjects were recruited via a pre-registration mailing and an announcement at the opening 
conference session. The choice experiment itself was conducted during a 1-hour session, 
typically scheduled as a parallel session in the conference program. During this session, subjects 
wewre first shown a brief presentation on the concept of Water Quality Trading, followed by 
instructions to complete the choice experiments.    11
  The instructions include much the same information as in the Design Attributes section 
above. A hypothetical situation was first described, in which subjects are asked to imagine that a 
WQT program had been developed in their region with different buyers giving them different 
types of opportunities to sell credits. The opportunities varied along five dimensions (the 
attributes in table 1). These attributes and their various levels were then explained. BMPs were 
explained in more detail than the other attributes to ensure that the producers understood what 
their contract responsibilities would be under each. Finally, the respondents were shown an 
example choice set to give them practice in completing the experiment.  
  After allowing for clarification questions, the subjects then filled out a booklet with 16 
choice sets. A printed copy of the background and instruction slides were also provided to 
subjects for their reference, and the instructions were also summarized at the beginning of the 
booklet. Each choice set in this booklet is followed by an open-ended question asking, “Why did 
you make this choice?” As explained in more detail below, these qualitative responses were 
helpful in choosing our econometric specification. After completing the booklet each subject 
completed a questionnaire eliciting information on his/her farm operation, his/her attitudes 
toward water quality issues and policies, and demographic data. Copies of all materials used in 
these sessions are available from the authors.  
After the instruments have been completed, each subject was paid an honorarium of $50 
in cash. This is announced in the pre-registration mailing and at the opening conference session 
to encourage participation. Our data collection procedures and instruments were pre-tested with a 
small group (12) of producers from the Great Plains.  
   12
Questionnaire Data 
Summary statistics from the questionnaire responses (n=135) are in Table 5. The average farmer 
in this sample owns 824 acres of cropland and rents 773 acres, for an average farm size of 1,597 
acres. However, the distribution of size is skewed, with a few very large operations; the 
maximum owned acres is 6,000 and the maximum rented acres is 10,000. These statistics are 
reflective of the overall distribution of farm sizes in Kansas, which has a few large farms at the 
upper tail of the distribution. Based on the 2002 Census of Agriculture, about 10% of all farm 
operations in Kansas exceed 2,000 acres (NASS). 
Many of the producers in the sample currently use one or more BMPs. The most popular 
BMP is minimum tillage, used by 55% of respondents, while the least popular on the list was 
filter strips, with only 19% of respondents using this practice. Notwithstanding farmers’ 
willingness to adopt BMPs, there is a persistent gap between their awareness of conservation 
programs and their participation in them. For example, 97% respondents are aware of the 
Conservation Reserve Program, but only 45% have participated in it. The gap is particularly 
stark for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), which has an awareness rate of 
about 80% but a participation rate of 31%. Similarly large gaps are present for the Conservation 
Security Program and the Kansas Buffer Initiative. Because these programs offer incentives that 
match and in some cases outweigh the monetary expenses of installing BMPs, the observed 
participation gap is consistent with the presence of intangible costs as reviewed above. 
  In terms of perceptions, farmers agree with the sentiment that water quality needs to be 
protected and that BMPs help reduce nutrient and sediment runoff. However, the average 
respondent was neutral on whether Kansas water supplies are polluted. The average response 
was also neutral on the statements that “Mandating BMP installation and management is unfair   13
to producers,” and that “Environmental legislation is often unfair to producers.” Two perception 
questions were included to test a commonly state hypothesis in the literature (e.g., King and 
Kuch, 2003) that farmers are reluctant to participate in WQT because they fear future regulation. 
The average respondent in our sample only slightly agreed with the statements that “A farmer 
who participates in a WQT market is more likely to be regulated in the future, compared to 
nonparticipants,” and that “If WQT markets emerge and are successful, future government 
regulations on agriculture will be more stringent than otherwise.” However, neither average is 
statistically different from zero. Thus, we find little evidence that such concerns prevent farmers 
from participating, at least explicitly. Finally, the experiment itself appeared to increase subjects’ 
knowledge of WQT, with the self-assessed level of knowledge increasing, on average, about 1.3 
points on a 5-point scale. The distribution of scores was also significantly tighter following the 
experiment.  
  The demographic data from our sample suggest it is fairly representative of the larger 
farm population. The average age of producers in our sample is 41.5 and is not statistically 
different from the population average of 56 based on the 2002 Census of Agriculture (NASS).  
About 81% of our respondents were male, compared to 91% of primary farm operators in 
Kansas, but again the difference is not statistically significant. The average producer has 15 years 
of formal education, or about 3 years beyond high school, and about 58% of respondents farm as 
their primary occupation. 
   14
Choice Data 
Turning now to the choice experiments, we recorded the choice made in 16 distinct scenarios by 
135 subjects, producing a dataset with 2,147 usable observations.
1 To give a sense of the choices 
the subjects made, Figure 2 shows the composition of these data across the 3 choices (options A, 
B, C) for the first 39 subjects in our dataset. Subjects in the figure are sorted by their frequency 
of choosing option C, the “do not participate” alternative. All 39 subjects chose to participate in 
the program (i.e., selecting either option A or B) in at least one scenario, and four subjects chose 
to participate in all 16 scenarios.  
  Participation was not dominated by either filter strip (option A) or no-till (option B) 
contracts. In scenarios where they participated, all but six subjects stated a willingness to choose 
either option, switching between the two as the non-BMP attributes (application time, 
monitoring, etc.) varied. In particular, only three subjects (#9, #25, #37) never chose option A 
and three additional subjects (#22, #26, #39) never chose B. Across the 620 choice sets in this 
sub-sample,  the distribution across the three choices were: A – 235 (38%), B – 205 (33%), and 
C – 180 (29%).  
  On the whole, our dataset is quite balanced dataset across the three alternatives. This 
property is one way of validating the ranges of the non-BMP attributes: these attributes were 
varied widely enough to entice participation in both types of BMP contracts, but also led to 
nonparticipation in some cases. Balance is also important because we will employ a discrete 
choice econometric model for analysis – a model family known to be unstable and to predict 
poorly if the dataset is unbalanced across choices. 
 
                                                 
1 Across all 135×16 = 2,160 choice sets presented to subjects, 13 choice responses were either missing or 
unreadable.    15
Model 
Various discrete choice econometric methods have been used to analyze choice experiment data, 
but all these methods are motivated by the random utility model. Suppose that on occasion t, 
individual i must chose one of several alternatives indexed by j. Let Uijt denote the utility 
enjoyed by individual i if he chooses alternative j on occasion t. The random utility model posits 
that Uijt can be partitioned into two additive components: 
Uijt = Vijt + εijt, 
where (dropping subscripts for simplicity), V is a function of observable variables and ε is a 
function of unobservable variables. Although individual i knows the values of both V and ε, the 
researcher lacks data on ε. This introduces a random element in utility across individuals from 
the researcher’s point of view.  
  An estimable econometric model is developed from the random utility model by (a) 
assuming that individuals make choices to maximize utility, U, (b) specifying V as a function of 
a vector of observable variables, x, and (c) making a specific distributional assumption about ε.  
For example, if V is specified as the linear function V = β'x and ε follows an extreme value type 
II distribution then the probability that i chooses j at time t is 
Pijt = Pr{Uijt > Uikt all k ≠ j} = 
exp( )







β x β x
 
This is known as the conditional logit model and is widely used in the literature. Given data on 
actual choices by sample of individuals, estimation of the parameters β can be achieved via 
maximum likelihood (Greene, 2003).  
One assumption embedded in the conditional logit model is that the parameters, β, are 
invariant across individuals. In our context, the variables in x would include the attributes of the   16
various trading choices. The β parameters can be interpreted as the marginal utilities of these 
attributes, so that the conditional logit model would assume the marginal utility of each attribute 
is identical across subjects.  
  However, the qualitative data collected in our choice experiment survey directly 
contradict this assumption. For example, in their written follow-up responses to scenarios where 
one of the alternatives had a much higher Penalty than the other, different subjects provided 
different types of comments. One variety is well summarized by the response, “I am assuming 
that I am going to comply and so I am not concerned with the penalty.” These individuals chose 
the option with the higher penalty, based on other attributes they found attractive such as higher 
revenue. Other subjects, who did not select the high penalty option, made comments similar to 
the following: “Payment is great per acre … but penalty is very high and checked every year. 
Sure I probably would not violate but don't want to take the chance.” Here, the concern appeared 
to be that the farmer would be found in violation of the contract even though he intends to 
comply.  
These responses lead us to hypothesize that farmers have differing preferences with 
respect to our key attributes. For the Penalty attribute, the heterogeneity in preferences would 
arise from differences in farmers’ subjective probabilities of being found in violation when 
intending to comply, as well as differences in their risk preferences. In order to test this 
hypothesis, we must specify a model that allows the β parameters to differ across individuals. 
One such model is the random parameters logit model. One or more of the parameters in the β 
vector are assumed to have a distribution across individuals, which can be specified by the 
researcher (e.g., normal or log-normal distribution). Rather than estimating the values of the β’s 
per se, the econometric problem is to estimate the underlying distributional parameters of the   17
randomly specified β’s across people (e.g., means, variances, and covariances). This model will 
be pursued to formally test whether the marginal utility parameters differ across farmers.  
 
Concluding Remarks and Next Steps 
The econometric model to be estimated from the choice data will be capable of predicting the 
trading choices of farmers in a WQT program under different trading rules. As part of our 
ongoing research project, our next goal is to run trading simulations under different types of rules 
to assess their effect on market performance. These simulations will be accomplished by 
inserting our estimated equations into a trading simulation model already developed by Smith 
(2004), which in turn is based on the sequential bilateral trading algorithm of Atkinson and 
Tietenberg (1991).  
Once the trading simulation model is complete, it will be linked to a biophysical 
watershed model being developed for the Kansas/Delaware Subbasin using SWAT  (Arnold et 
al., 1998; Neitsch et al., 2001). The linked models will then be run in tandem to assess the joint 
performance of various market designs on economic measures as well as on water quality in 
different river segments. The objective is to identify a set of trading rules that are simple enough 
to attract adequate participation while being sufficiently tailored to ensure that water quality 
goals are indeed met.  
  As this project is a work in progress and data collection is still underway, only very 
preliminary results are available. The initial results obtained from our choice experiments 
suggest that the attribute levels provide a range of incentives to which subjects respond in 
different ways. Demographic variables in our dataset suggest our sample is so far weighted 
somewhat toward younger and female producers. More formal tests of demographic   18
representativeness will be conduced as data collection progresses, and adjustments will be made 
as needed to change our sampling strategy or correct our regression by reweighting different 
demographic cohorts.   19
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Table 1.  Design Attributes and Levels
Attribute Variable Name Levels
Application Time (hours) Time 4, 16, 24, 40
Monitoring method  Monitoring Annual verification, Spot check
Penalty ($/acre enrolled)  Penalty 50, 100, 250, 500
Annual trading revenue ($/acre enrolled)  Revenue 3, 7, 15, 25
Best Management Practice BMP Filter strip (no haying/grazing), Filter strip (with 
haying/grazing), 100% No-till, Rotational No-till  
   22
Table 2. Credits Generated by Best Management Practices
Best Management Practice Credits Generated
credits/acre/year
Filter strip (no haying/grazing) 12
Filter strip (with haying/grazing) 6
100% No-till 9
Rotational No-till 5    23
Table 3. Designed Choice Sets
Set Ver.
a Time Monitoring
b Penalty Revenue BMP
c Time Monitoring
b Penalty Revenue BMP
d
1 1 24 SC 50 7 FSH 4 AV 500 25 NT
2 1 4 SC 500 15 FSH 16 AV 100 15 NT
3 1 24 SC 250 15 FSNH 24 SC 500 15 RNT
4 1 40 AV 50 25 FSNH 24 AV 100 3 RNT
5 1 4 AV 500 25 FSH 4 SC 250 15 RNT
6 1 4 AV 100 3 FSNH 24 AV 250 25 NT
7 1 4 SC 250 3 FSH 40 SC 50 3 NT
8 1 24 AV 100 15 FSH 40 AV 100 7 RNT
9 1 40 SC 250 7 FSH 16 AV 250 7 RNT
10 1 40 AV 100 7 FSNH 4 SC 50 15 RNT
11 1 40 SC 50 15 FSNH 40 SC 250 3 NT
12 1 16 AV 500 3 FSNH 40 AV 500 7 RNT
13 1 24 AV 50 3 FSH 16 SC 50 25 RNT
14 1 16 AV 100 25 FSH 16 SC 500 3 NT
15 1 16 SC 250 25 FSNH 4 AV 100 25 NT
16 1 16 SC 500 7 FSNH 24 SC 50 7 NT
17 2 40 AV 250 3 FSH 4 SC 100 7 NT
18 2 4 AV 250 7 FSH 24 AV 500 3 RNT
19 2 16 AV 250 15 FSNH 16 SC 250 25 RNT
20 2 16 SC 50 3 FSH 24 SC 100 15 RNT
21 2 24 AV 250 25 FSNH 40 AV 50 15 NT
22 2 16 AV 50 7 FSH 40 AV 250 15 NT
23 2 4 AV 50 15 FSNH 4 SC 500 7 NT
24 2 24 SC 500 3 FSNH 4 AV 250 3 RNT
25 2 4 SC 100 7 FSNH 40 SC 100 25 RNT
26 2 24 AV 500 7 FSNH 16 SC 100 3 NT
27 2 24 SC 100 25 FSH 24 SC 250 7 NT
28 2 40 AV 500 15 FSH 24 AV 50 25 NT
29 2 16 SC 100 15 FSH 4 AV 50 3 RNT
30 2 40 SC 100 3 FSNH 16 AV 500 15 NT
31 2 4 SC 50 25 FSNH 16 AV 50 7 RNT
32 2 40 SC 500 25 FSH 40 SC 500 25 RNT
a Survey version. Sets 1-16 were in version 1; 17-32 in version 2.
b SC = Spot check; AV = Annual verification
c FSH = Filter strip (with haying/grazing); FSNH = Filter strip (no haying/grazing)
d NT = 100% No-till; RNT = Rotational No-till
Option A Attributes Option B Attributes
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Table 4. Data Collection Sites
Date Event Name Location Subjects
August 17, 2006 Risk and Profit Conference Manhattan, KS 38
December 7, 2006 Sunflower Agricultural Profitability Conference Smith Center, KS 11
January 12, 2007 Post Rock Agricultural Profitability Conference Colby, KS 44
January 26, 2007 Kansas Farm Bureau Conference Wichita, KS 42
  Total 135   25





Owned cropland (acres) 824 1237 0 6000
Rented cropland (acres) 773 1298 0 10000
Cropland bordering waterbodies (proportion)
a 0.782 0.414 0 1
Best Management practices in use (proportion)
a
Filter strip 0.187 0.391 0 1
Minimum tillage 0.552 0.499 0 1
Rotational no-till 0.433 0.497 0 1
Exclusive (100%) No-till 0.276 0.449 0 1
Terraces 0.724 0.449 0 1
Sub-surface application of fertilizer 0.358 0.481 0 1
Contour farming 0.336 0.474 0 1
Familiarity/participation with conservation programs (proportion)
a
Conservation Reserve Program: Familiar With? 0.970 0.172 0 1
Conservation Reserve Program: Participated In? 0.453 0.500 0 1
Environmental Quality Incentives Program: Familiar With? 0.805 0.398 0 1
Environmental Quality Incentives Program: Participated In? 0.306 0.463 0 1
Conservation Security Program: Familiar With? 0.632 0.484 0 1
Conservation Security Program: Participated In? 0.100 0.301 0 1
Kansas Buffer Initiative: Familiar With? 0.444 0.499 0 1
Kansas Buffer Initiative: Participated In? 0.083 0.278 0 1
Perceptions
Level of agreement with the following statements:
b
"Best management practices (BMPs) reduce nutrient and sediment 
runoff." 1.16 0.78 -2 2
"Kansas surface water quality needs to be protected." 1.24 0.71 -2 2
"Kansas groundwater quality needs to be protected." 1.32 0.65 -2 2
"Mandating BMP installation and management is unfair to 
producers." 0.32 0.99 -2 2
"Environmental legislation is often unfair to producers." 0.47 0.90 -2 2
"Kansas surface waters are polluted." 0.24 0.87 -2 2
"Kansas groundwater supplies are polluted." -0.04 0.82 -2 2
"A farmer who participates in a water quality trading market is 
more likely to be regulated in the future, compared to 
nonparticipants." 0.19 1.08 -2 2
"If water quality trading markets emerge and are successful, future 
government regulations on agriculture will be more stringent than 
otherwise." 0.68 0.91 -2 2
Self-assessment of knowledge of Water Quality Trading:
c
Before participating in experiment -1.03 0.95 -2 2
After participating in experiment 0.28 0.65 -1 2
Demographics
Gender (1=male, 0=female) 0.806 0.397 0 1
Age (years) 41.5 15.6 18 81
Years of formal education (12=high school, etc.) 15.1 2.0 12 20
Farming primary occupation 0.579 0.496 0 1
a Responses in proportions indicate the share of subjects choosing a particular response, not a share of acreage.
b Responses measured on a 5-point scale, where -2=strongly disagree, -1=disagree, 0=neutral, 1=agree, and 2=strongly agree. 
b Responses measured on a 5-point scale, where -2=very low, -1=low, 0=moderate, 1=high, and 2=very high.     26
Scenario 8 
 
You have two opportunities to sell credits in a Water Quality Trading market, given by Option A and 
Option B below. Your choices are to enroll your entire 100-acre field in one of these options (but not 
both) or neither of them.   
 
  Option A  Option B  Option C 
Application time (hours) 24 40 
Monitoring method Annual verification  Annual verification 
Penalty for violations ($/acre enrolled) 100 100 
Best Management Practice (BMP) Filter strip (with 
haying/grazing)  Rotational no-till  
     
Price and Cost information      
Offer price per credit ($/credit/year) $2.50  $1.40 
Credits generated per acre enrolled 6  5 
Credit Revenue ($/acre/year) $15.00  $7.00 
Do Not Enroll 
      
Which option would you choose?
(mark one box only)         
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  Figure 2. Distribution of Responses from Choice Experiments, First 39 Subjects 
 